30 May 2006

Leak Of Rupture Disc

Safety Incident Topic: Rupture Disc Leak
Location Of Incident: Whitting USA
Date Of Incident: 30th March 2006

Brief Account Of Incident
At the FCU 500 / 600 Fractionator Towers, the relief valves are protected from the process hydrocarbons by rupture disks.

On Thursday, March 30, 2006, it was discovered that the rupture disks were leaking, with system pressure equalized on both the top and bottom of the rupture disk. Rupture disks may not function as designed if pressure is allowed to build between the disk and the relief valve. This disk back pressure potentially compromises relief system capacity.

Potential Outcome
Potential that the rupture disks and thus relief valve would fail to operate properly in a release scenario, compromising relief system capacity.

Action Taken
- We are removing the rupture disks from the Fractionator RVs at both FCUs. We will work continuously until it is completed.
- We have formed a joint union / management investigation team to understand and determine what processes and management systems were or were not in place that led us to our current situation.
Additional teams will:
- Complete an (Root Cause Failure Analysis) RCFA for the rupture disks at the FCUs.
- Evaluate operation and safety for FCU Fractionator Tower RVs without the use of rupture disks.
- Review all other installations at Whiting where rupture disks are in service with RVs.
- Accelerates a previously scheduled project to upgrade the existing RV metallurgy. This will eliminate the need for rupture disks long term.

Tank Farm Gas Oil Overflow

Safety Incident Topic: Tank 220x1 Overflow
Location Of Incident: Coryton Refinery, UK
Date Of Incident: 25th April, 2006

Brief Account of Incident
220x1 is a 220,000 barrel tank which is normally used to feed the distillate hydrotreater (CHD) with Atmospheric Gas Oil (AGO). In the period Feb 9th – April 23rd the CHD was shutdown for turnaround maintenance.

At around 01.00 on Monday 24th April the CHD was being commissioned with tank 220x1 designated as the rundown tank. The unit was started up successfully but the gauge on the tank did not register an increase in level. The Product Movement (PM) panelman re-set the gauge which then started to rise steadily consistent with the run-down from the CHD.

At 03.05 the gauge stuck at a reading a reading of 19.7 m. The outside operator, who is responsible for monitoring tank 220x1 failed to recognise that the product had been steadily entering the tank between 01.30 and 03.05 and interpreted from the “flat lining” of the tank gauge that no product was being delivered from the CHD. At the 06.00 shift handover the outside operator advised the on-coming shift that 220x1 was open to the CHD but nothing was coming down from the unit.

During the day shift on Monday 24th April the tank dip in 220x1 remained constant and the outside operator handed back to the on-coming shift (same operator as the previous night) with the same message he had received at the start of the shift i.e. nothing was being rundown into 220x1 from the CHD.

At 02.00 on Tuesday 25th April the PM panelman prepared to deliver a line flush of 100m3 from tank 220x1 to Jetty 5. The panelman noted that although the receiving vessel confirmed receipt of 100m3 of gas-oil from 220x1 the tank gauge had not registered this movement. The PM panelman interrogated the 220x1 gauging system between 02.09 hrs and 03.17 hrs to try and re-establish the level in this tank. After failing to establish the level he decided to wait for the on-coming day shift to take over the investigation of this problem.

At 05.09 hrs tank gauge on 220x1 changed from a reading of 0 m3 and rapidly climbs to a level 21.75m activating both the hi level alarm (set @ 21.5m) and the hi-hi alarm (set @ 21.7m) at 05.15 hrs. The outside operator was alerted and investigated the problem in the field. On seeing the tank over-filling and product entering the North Moat surface water system he closed the North Moat penstock to prevent the spillage entering the River Thames via the Dorr Oliver oil-water separator, switched the CHD run-down into another tank and gravitated tank 220x1 into a 3rd tank.

Potential Outcome(s)
The actual outcomes of the incident was a spill of 918 barrels of AGO into the North Moat system. There was potential for a more extensive environmental incident if the oil had not been isolated from the final surface water clean up system where it is then routed to the River Thames. The cost of the incident was $40K, mainly for the clean up of the spill.

What Went Well
The operator made the right decision in isolating the North Moat system before dealing with the tank spill. Clean up of the spill was started immediately and the majority of the oil recovered into the crude slop system. No oil entered the River Thames.

What Went Wrong (Possible Critical Factors)
The critical factors in this incident were the “sticking” of the gauge, the failure to recognise this, the lack of understanding of PM Operations personnel as to what the status of tank 220x1 was, the failure to manually dip when the gauge was found not to be working, and the failure to alarm at hi-level due to the “sticking” of the gauge. Additionally, after the leak the product was not held in the bund due to a broken penstock valve which allowed gas-oil to transfer into the North Moat.

Immediate Cause(s)
· Defective equipment: tank gauge and penstock valve on 220x1.
· Improper decision making / lack of judgement: improper response to the stuck gauge just prior to the spill occurring.
· Inattention / Lack of awareness: failure of the operator to accurately monitor tank 220x1.

System Cause(s)
The root cause for the “sticking” level gauge has not yet been identified and is still under investigation. The other root causes identified were:
· Inadequate monitoring of operations.
· Inadequate communication between work groups and peers.
· Failure of the hi-level alarms to annunciate due to the sticking” of the gauge.
· Inadequate identification of worksite/job hazard and subsequent poor judgement.
· Inadequate monitoring and repair of the bund penstock valve which was in need of repair.

Corrective Actions (summary only)
1· Tank gauge on 220x1 changed out to aid fault identification.
2· Condition of all penstocks reviewed and work in-progress to repair broken/leaking valves.
3· Independent hi-level alarms are already fitted on crude / gasoline tanks & all floating roof tanks.
4. Develop a plan for extending application of independent tank alarms.
5· Develop PI-data spreadsheets to aid identification of frozen gauges versus static tanks and to assist tank farm operators in monitoring operations.

21 May 2006

Blind Rolled By Mistake

Safety Incident Topic: Blind Rolled By Mistake
Location Of Incident: Texas City
Date Of Incident: 9 May, 2006

Brief Account of Incident
FCCU-3 Operations, with the help of a representative from the turn around group, prepared an authorization to work (ATW) for the overall task of installing blinds and making modifications to the slurry pump suction system. The ATW identified the need for fresh air equipment to mitigate the risk of exposure to a nitrogen rich atmosphere. A representative from operations accompanied the contract pipe fitter foreman to the work site and identified the appropriate location for the installation of a blind flange. The pipe fitter foreman walked two contract employees (pipe fitters) that had been loaned to him from another crew, to the site of the work and identified the flange to be blinded by shining a flashlight on the flange. A job safety analysis (“A.S.A.P. card) was completed by the foreman and the pipe fitters. The pipe fitters set up the fresh air equipment and their foreman acquired two gaskets to use when bolting up the flange. The blind was brought to the job site and left on a pallet at this time. After overcoming some issues with the fresh air system the fitters proceeded to unbolt the flange between vessel 401-E and the valve. By breaking containment on the vessel a large quantity of nitrogen was released into the surrounding atmosphere and the vessel was depressurized. A low pressure alarm in the control room was activated and a board operator responded by alerting an outside operator. The outside operator stopped work.

Potential Outcomes
- Oxygen Deficient Environment possibly resulting in serious injury or fatality.
- What Went Wrong (Critical Factors): Pipe fitters opened the wrong Flange.

Immediate Causes
Ineffective Communication between Supervisor and Employees. The Altair Strickland foreman’s direction to his employees did not accomplish the goal of getting the two pipe fitters to install a 20 inch blind flange in the correct location, downstream of the 401E block valve.

System Causes
1. Inadequate Vertical communication between supervisor and person: The employees and the foreman had different understandings of the task to be completed.
2. Verification/repeat back techniques not used There was no method in place to ensure the fitters understood what they were being asked to do
3. Inadequate Leadership – Inadequate work site walk-through: The fitters reported not seeing the foreman at the job site from the time they were left to do their work until the incident occurred

Corrective Actions/Lessons Learned
- Have a person from operations present at every line break.
- Ensure the employees doing the work understand the risks of the process and area they are working and the task they are to perform explained to them

15 May 2006

Explosion Oxygen Injection Line

Safety Incident Topic : Explosion Oxygen Injection Line
Location Of Incident : Netherland
Date Of Incident : 8th March 2006

Brief Account of Incident
A small explosion occured during commissioning of temporary 2" oxygen line in use for catalyst regeneration on catalytic reforming unit. No injuries occured. A part from a total loss of the injection line there was no significant damage but delay in the regeneration process. After safeguarding the unit catalyst regeneration was progressed with air as opposed to pure the oxygen.

The stainless steel line is only used for catalyst regenerations which are carried out roughly ance every 18 months. In between times the line is fullt segregated from the rest of the unit and spaded off at valve connection at the unit. This to prevent ingress of dirt and/or hydrocarbon. Both precursors for violent reaction with pure oxygen. At the time of the incident one of the connection turned out to be still in place with no spade installed and with the valve closed. This was noted during the unit check up before the regeneration period and was reported but people did not realised the possible consequences. It turned out that the valve had leaked hydrocarbons over 1.5 years after the previous - and had built up in the line, sufficient to cause the explosion upon commission the oxygen flow.

Potential Outcome
Serious injury or fatality as the incident happened close to a unit walkway.

What When Wrong
. Oxygen System connection not segregared from the process line after the previous catalyst regeneration (at the end of a cycle ending turnaround)
. Nobody inticipating the inherent risk of possible hydrocarbon ingress into the oxygen system

Immediate Causes
. Violation by group: the procedure for de-spading was not followed properly.
. Lack of judgement: people did not realised the possible consequences of the connected line
. Routine activity without thought: sign off the spading list assuming the line would have been disconnected and the assumption that the hydrocarbons would never enter the line.
. Inadequate isolation of process: no spool removed / spade present.
. Defective equipment: passing valve

System Caused
. Emotional overload: pressure to immediate start up after turnaround.
. Inadequate identification of critical behaviours doing check ups.
. Inadequate development of PSP's: spading list did not mention the removal of the spool piece.
. Inadequate communication between the people doing the work after the TAR and the acceptors of that work.

Corrective Actions
. Remove the valves at the connection point - this will force removal of the spool piece and spading after regens.
. Improve spading list and procedures for catalyst reformer regenerations.
. Adjust training program contents to make people more sensible for risks that are not so obvious.

14 May 2006

Chemical Released From The Reactor

Safety Incident Topic: Chemical Released
Location Of Incident: Mai Liao, Taiwan
Date Of Incident: 22nd December 2005

Brief Account Of Incident
An estimated 4-5 tonnes of Reactor material was released due to failure of a week joint at nozzle 16A of a 6" minimum flow line of a catalyst recycle pump. A microsphere glass filled PTFE gasket (GYLON 3504) which was installed at a CL150 pipe flange failed due to overpressure. The incident occured during commissioning activities where the plant was being prepared for the first start-up following completion of catalyst conversion. The estimated value of material lost is USD 150, 000.

There were no injury to personnel and no breach of environmental consent during this incident. All materials released were contained within the complex's effluent system boundary.

Potential Outcome
Potential serious injury to personnel

Likely Causes
. Inadequate technical design - design output inconsistent
. Inadequate standards, specifications, and/or design criteria
. Inadequate evaluation and/or documentation of change

Action Taken
. The plant start-up activities stopped
. The spill area was immediately secured to prevent unauthorized entry
. Cause of the joint failure determined and split backing flanges added to reinforce the joints.
. minimum flow valve is capped at 82% opening maximum.
. Recommendation sought from the design contractor to increase the strength at the joint as a permanent solution.

Fall From Height

Safety Incident Topic: Fall From Height
Location Of Incident: Decatur, USA
Date Of Incident: 24th January, 2006

Brief Account Of Incident
Following drum de-coking on Coker III, Coker operations personnel were preparing to close the bottom head of the empty West Coke drum. This preparation required the moveable platform to be mechanically moved away from the East Coke Drum bottom head, and repositioned under the West Coke Drum bottom head. The platform had not traversed its full distance, leaving a large opening over the coke chute. During the course of this platform positioning work, the De-coker Operator stepped off the moveable platform and fell approximately 12 feet onto the coke chute, and ultimately into the production Coke pit.

Refinery emergency responders extracted the employee from the coke pit. He was then transported to the local hospital and has been admitted for treatment. Following medical tests, the initial medical reports have concluded that the employee sustained no serious injuries. He is currently resting comfortably in stable condition and is in very good spirits.

Potential Outcome
Severe injuries including potential for fatality

Likely Causes
. Platform was not completely positioned to cover the opening above the coke chute.
. Visibility constraints due to steam from coke pit.

Actions Taken
. Employee was transported for medical treatment.
. Moveable platform was properly positioned.

13 May 2006

Fatality By The Carrydeck Crane

Safety Incident Topic: Fatality By The Carrydeck Crane
Location Of Incident: Australia
Date Of Incident: 29th June, 2005

Brief Account Of Incident
A fan impeller and shaft assembly was being transported from the Potroom workshop to be installed at the Gas Treatment Centre #1 (GTC1) using a 8.5 tonne Carrydeck Crane. The Carrydeck driver had restricted vision in front of him. He approached the GTC1 worksite and hooted the hone.

At approximately 1030am Johannes Du Plessis was supervising the installation of the fan at the GTC1, had completed a call on his cell phone and stepped backwards from between the structure column onto the roadway looking upwards, apparently to have a cigarette. Johannes did not respond to the approaching Carrydeck. The driver did not see johannes and the Carrydeck struck and passed over him impacting fatal injuries. He died at the scene within minutes despite efforts by the paramedics.

What Went Wrong
. The impeller was loaded onto the carry deck in such a way that forward vision was significantly imfacted.
. The risk of driving the crane with impacted vision was recognised but the job proceeded without additional controls.

Contributing Factors
. The work area was not adequately barricaded from passing traffic.
. The ambient noise of the GTC1 area masked the noise of the approaching crane.
. No escort was used to control the risk of restricted forward vision of the crane driver.
. There was no systematic demarcation of pedestrians from vehicle traffic in the GTC1 area.
. Johannes may have been distracted by his early knock off and the pending arrival of his wife.
. He may have been fatigued due to the protracted hours he had worked in the preceding days
. He walked backwards onto the road.

Lesson Learned
. Implementation of identified controls post risk assessment are often not fully implemented.
. Management of subtle change is not well understood and carried out.
. Contractors are often not fully integrated into the management, operation and culture of the site.
. Effective implementation of the fatal Risk Control Protocols would have prevented accidents such as this one.

. Empower and encourage employee s and contractors to STOP the JOB whenever they feel unsafe
. Review and improve change management process and training to ensure the potential risks from small changes are considered (eg impeller loading method was changed).
. Clarify reporting change of command and ensure all are concerned are fully aware of this.
. Ensure rigorous implementation of the newly developed Fatigue Management Plan to all staff and contractors.
. The risk associated with travelling with loads on Carrydeck cranes must be included in training modules.

Diesel Spillage

Safety Incident Topic: Diesel spillage
Location Of Incident: Brisbane, Australia
Date Of Incident: 30th July, 2005

Brief Account Of Incident
On Saturday, July approx 80,000 litres of Diesel overflowed from one of two slops tanks. The slops tanks had a flaw in the high level alarm, whereby if one of the two tanks alarms activation (eg got wet) the other tank alarm would not work. The alarms were wired to operate as one not individually. This flaw was known but risk of both tanks filling at the same time deemed low. This was due to the relative inactivity of use and operational work around which was in place.

Prior to the incident one slops tank (WS 9996) had been filling during an interface between Jet and Diesel and had activated the high level alarm. This alarm was turn off and the other slops tank valve opened so WS 9996 could not be used. However as WS 9996 alarm probe was still wet the new slops tank (WS 9997) effectively had no working high level alarm.

Several previous incidents had occured with the operation of the slops tank resulting in two previous near misses and a HAZOP notation. The procedures for operation had been discussed at operators meeting.

The operator at the time forgot to close the slops valve after interface, allowing the next two transfer of product to bleed into both the Diesel tank and the open slops tank (WS9997) - with no active alarm and the operator not being aware he had left valve open. The tank filled approx 90,000 litre tank.

The operator did not return to the manifold until advised of the spill (some 2 1/2 hours) even with a change in transfer. This was a procedural breach. The operator did not consider the new transfer to be a risk as the same product was being transferred and could monitor from office.

Whilst the spill of 80,000 litres is serious it could be have been much worse as the transfer still had another 1/2 hour to go before the end of the transfer. The tanker driver only smelt the fumes and investigated to then see the spill. The spill escaped secondary containment and it was solely due to quick and early action of those involved that prevented the spill from migrating off site.

What Went wrong
The following root / system causes were identified as follows.
. poor judgement
. Inadequate leadership
. Inadequate enforcement of PSP
. Inadequate correction of prior hazard
. Inadequate assessment of needs and risks
. Inadequate identification of critical safe behaviours
. Inadequate audit / monitoring

Lessons Learned
The spill occurred because an individual had a memory/ perception failure and also failed to follow procedures. At the root of these failures is both an inability by management to recognise a circumstance where such a failure could occur, and failyre by leadership and staff to identify critical safe behaviours. There was an awareness of the high level alarm problems but a risk assessment found the risk 'LOW". A lack of formality in the risk assessment process.

12 May 2006

Polymer Inhibitor Splash

Safety Incident Topic: Polymer Inhibitor Splash
Location Of Incident: Optimal Olefin Plant, Malaysia
Date Of Incident: Not Known

Brief Account Of Incident
Two personnel, one contractor and one Optimal employee were sprayed with chemical polymer inhibitor, Petroflo 20Y97. Both were attended by Doctor Wan and given first aid treatment. The Optimal employee resumed work after teratment. But the contractor was sent to Dungun Hospital and subsequently to Kuala Terengganu Hospital for further treatment.

The incident happened while they were disconnected a tubing line as part of RTM (isolation) process. Formal root cause investigation is still on going.

Preliminary observations were:
1. It was a closed loop system that was supposed to have been drained. Timing of this activity still being verified.
2. Line condition was not verified at the time of the incident.
3. Drain valve was opened upstream of an isolation valve that was closed. The disconnecting point was downstream of this valve.
4. Tubing was disconnected and after a few minutes material came out of the tubing.

My Personal Comment as the incident investigation report was not available for me
1. The incident shows the value in having appropriate protection when doing first break.
2. The principle will apply on every first break even after plant preparation is completed with an expectation that the engineering workforce will wear a visor and splash resistant smock.
3. For contractor assisting the plant praparation then this should be cover under the permit; they do not have the experience that our guy have of handling petrochemicals and need close controls and supervision.

Welded Pump Drain Pipe Cracked

Safety Incident : A crack in the weld of a pump drain pipe
Location Of Incident : Lingen, Germany
Date Of Incident : 10th May 2005

Brief Account Of Safety Incident
On May 10, 2005, a contracted company performed assembly work on the RF1- Feedpump GA-1804 B, and damaged a drain pipe of the pump housing. A strong gas leakage occurred close to the feed furnace BA-1801/02.

O Formation of a gas cloud of light gasoline, downstream of the reformer furnace. The cloud was stemmed by changing over to an available parallel pump, while applying adequate PSA and the involvement of the fire brigade (department).
Possible result:
O Danger of people and operating units in the event that the gas cloud would have ignited close to the reformer furnace.

What went well:
O The contractor informed control room operators immediately.
O Quick identification of the problem on site
O Quick and safe change of the leaking pump by the operators and the use of heavy breathing mask and the support of the fire department.
O Fortunately the wind direction was turned away from the furnace.

What went wrong:
As a general rule, it is prohibited to step onto pipes regardless if assembly work is done or during operations. Unfortunately this cannot always be avoided due to the location of shutdown valves or other pipe accessoires. A weld failed at a location which was not fulfilling the required quality levels.

Direct causes:
Leakage due to stepping on the drain pipe.
An insufficient weld at the pump drainage.

Causes in the system:
Reconsidering of Integrity management for inspection and documentation of nozzles.

Direct measurements:
O Immediate repair of the defect weld.
O Inspection of neighboring welds, also at the parallel feedpump GA-1804A via x-rays (without findings).
O Clarifying discussion with the contractor, who can demonstrate long lasting experience in the Lingen refinery.

Additional measurements:
O Updating of the nozzle-inspection-program incl. documentation and determination of periodic inspections.
O Installing of additional fittings on the suction and pressure side of the feed pumps (HAZOP-safety discussion is still necessary!!)
O Automatic extinguish-vapor-supply to the reformer furnace is planned (TAR 2006).

Lessons Learned
O Leakages even on small pipes could have serious consequences for people and equipment.
O nozzle inspection programs must be completed and well documented.
O For limitation of damages process units have to be devided up into smaller, containable sections.

It has been seldom that Pump drain pipes failed, however, when they failed, it was due to corrosion. As a result of a mechanical rupture of a pump nuzzle at reformer-1, a nozzle testing program was developed. All pumps that operate with hazardous goods were listed, classified based on its potential risk, and the nozzle welds radio-graphically examined. The result was rather shocking.
Not only did we identify unacceptable weld imperfections and design deficiencies on fillet and flange welds on pumps which are 50 and more years old, also pumps that are of a more recent date of manufacture came out with the same results. Depending on the testing result, repairs were initiated right away or scheduled for the upcoming TAR in 2006.
Per definition, Pumps are machines that fall within the scope of the European Directive for Machinery (98/37/EC). It seems that in accordance with the machinery directive, non-destructive testing requirements are not as stringent as they are in accordance with the pressure equipment directive (97/23/EC) and the associated engineering and construction codes (e.g. . AD-Merkblatt 2000, EN 13445, EN 13480, ASME Section VIII Div.-1). What is required though is a pressure test as part of integrity/safety testing requirements.
From now on, we will require a non-destructive examination of nozzles and welded assembly parts, which carry external loads. The evaluation will be performed in accordance with EN 25817, Quality Level C (Moderate) or B (Stringent), or equivalent quality standards and levels.

Lost Of Containment From Hose

Safety Incident Topic: Lost Of Containment from Hose
Location Of Incident: Hull, UK
Date Of Incident: 30 April, 2005

Brief Account Of Incident
After the 7-day campaign of the S522 evaporator was complete, an attempt was made, as per procedure, to blow the contents to a storage tank using nitrogen pressure, but solids in the outlet line prevented this. Operators tried several methods to unblock the pipe without success, and eventually connected a steam hose to the pipe to try to clear the blockage. This method had been used successfully in the past. Over the next 4 hours the hose was checked frequently, and there were no leaks, but then the steam hose coupling parted. Approximately 2.5 tes of flammable liquid (50% butyl acetate/50% acetic acid) were released from about 8 metres above ground. The liquid flowed down over pumps and equipment below for about 15 minutes, but did not ignite.

The hose connection was a BOSS type. The female part of the coupling was seized. When operating correctly, the coupling can be tightened without moving the hose. Because the female part was seized, it is believed that the action of uncoiling the hose, and other movement when condensate was drained, had gradually unscrewed the coupling.

This connection should rotate freely to allow assembly but it was found to be seized onto the female side of the coupling

What Went Wrong (Critical Factors)
· Defective Equipment: The hose coupling parted, due to inadequate design and/or maintenance.Inadequate Identification of Safe Behaviour/Poor Judgment: Use of steam to clear blockages on acid plants is a relatively routine activity. The operators did not appreciate the hazards of this task, and there was no written procedure or risk assessment.
· Site rules require that if a hose is to be used in a ‘closed circuit’ then the Group Engineer should be asked whether Management of Change review is required. This was not done.
· Following Procedures: The use of hoses did not comply with site procedures.
· Inadequate Implementation of Policies, Standards and Procedures: Site rules on the use of hoses had been significantly changed in 2003. The changes were communicated, but this appears to have been ineffective, since knowledge of the new rules is inadequate, and some of the necessary modifications to equipment have still to be implemented.

What Went Well
.Response to the incident by operators and the site emergency response team was excellent. .Foam was applied, and the liquid was contained within the plant and recovered.

Lessons Learned
· The design and maintenance of the hose couplings will be reviewed.
· The requirement for risk assessment of potentially hazardous tasks requires re-emphasising, especially for tasks that are not covered by operating procedures and are infrequent or non-routine.
· The method of communicating changes to site rules requires improvement.
· Management audit systems need to include audits of compliance with site rules.

Key Messages
The operators were working very hard to find a way of unblocking the line. However the risks of this relatively routine activity were not adequately identified – there was no operating procedure, and no risk assessment was carried out.

Malaysia Road Incident

Safety Incident Topic: Malaysia Road Incident
Location Of Incident: Kuala Selangor-Teluk Intan trunk road
Date Of Incident: 21 May, 2005

Brief Account Of Incident
On 21st of May 2005 at about 1220 hrs, a laden BP Contractor road tanker on the way to deliver product to Telok Intan retail site 160km north of the terminal met with an accident with a motorcycle at 100km north of the terminal.

Sadly the 67-yr-old motorcyclist died at the hospital and there was no injury to the road tanker driver. The road tanker was escorted by the police to discharge product at the nearest retail station. The road tanker is now detained at the police station for further investigation. BP response team is already at the site to provide assistance to the driver and the police.

At the time of this reporting there was no media exposure of this accident.

An investigation team will be put together to find out the root causes of the accident after discussion with the segment HSSE VP.

My Company Policy Toward Health, Safety And Environmental

My Company Policy Toward Health, Safety And Environmental (HSE)

Everybody who works for company responsible for getting HSE right. Good HSE performance and the health, safety and security of everyone who works for us are critical to the success of company.

Our goals are aligned with those of company worldwide - no accidents, no harm to people, and no damage to the environment.

We will strive for excellence in safety, health and environmental protection, and in biodiversity. We will produce a quality product that can be used safely by our customers.

To achieve these, we will continuously:
· Consult, listen and respond openly to our customers, employees, neighbours, public interest groups and those who work with us;

· Identify and assess all related issues to our plant operation and the distribution of our product by means of recognized methods.

· Ensure compliance with the rules and regulations of the company and local authorities, with state and federal laws, and will apply the best codes of practices as far as is practicable.

· Provide training for competency to manage the system efficiently, educate all employees to instil awareness and ensure adherence to policy and procedures.

· Openly report our performance, good and bad and recognise those who contribute to improve HSE performance.

Our business plan includes measurable HSE targets, which we are all committed to meet. Our responsibility to manage Plant Operations, HSE and Emergency Response is not only for our own benefit but equally for that of our neighbouring plants and community.

My Personal Safety Action Plan

· I will take action with every 'unsafe act and unsafe condition (SUSA)' and record them in the SUSA form.

· I will wear a suitable Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) during handling chemical

· I will ask my friend if I do not understand before doing my job.

. I will participate in every Safety Talk event.

. I will ensure safety is the first priority in plant operation.

. I will follow safety procedure before doing my job.

. I will carry out plant housekeeping end of the shift.

. I will be a defensive driver and will not using mobile phone while driving.

. As a Permit Issuer I will ensure that on site preparation is done before issuing the permit